1946–1963: Turmoil That Contributed to the Marginalization of Kurdish Identity in Syria
By: Shivan Ibrahim
In his book "The Kurds of Syria: History, Politics, and Society," author Jordi Tejel discusses the period of turmoil and conflict in Syria and its impact on the Kurds.
After the last French soldier left Syria, the country entered a period of political, social, and economic turmoil that lasted for two decades. This period gave rise to political violence and the establishment of military dictatorships. Furthermore, the realities on the ground, the education system, development challenges, and other issues that directly affected Syrian society all contributed to deepening identity conflicts. In addition, the settlement of nomadic groups in areas outside their traditional territories, the emergence of an urban middle class, and the Arab-Israeli conflict all contributed to the creation of new internal and regional dynamics. These developments left the Kurds unable to play an effective role in asserting their national identity.
The Four Stages of Turmoil
The First Phase:
The agricultural developments of the previous century brought about fundamental social and economic transformations throughout Syria. Naturally, these changes also affected the Kurds, who had relied on agriculture for many decades, as farming was the most prominent occupation practiced by Kurds during the Ottoman era and one of the main sources of stability.
Conversely, the repercussions of World War I negatively affected the economy, as imports declined and the French authorities were forced to establish the Grain Office in 1939, known as "Mira," as a mechanism to secure food supplies. Small farmers benefited from this system by selling their crops and investing their profits to acquire additional resources and purchase more agricultural land.
However, three major shifts contributed to the emergence of a lasting problem:
• Wealthy merchants with significant capital, who came from inland Syrian provinces, gained prominent roles and privileges and obtained competitive agricultural concessions in the Kurdish region at the expense of poorer farmers and peasants with fewer resources.
• Increased agricultural production created new opportunities for economic development and expanded the role of merchants, leading to tensions between incoming merchants on one side and tribal and clan leaders on the other due to competition over social status.
• Kurdish society became divided between a class that controlled key economic and political positions and another that was negatively affected by rapid agricultural development. As the number of water pumps in the country reached 5,068 in 1951, irrigation became possible across thousands of hectares, while agricultural machinery and tractors played an increasingly important role. This contributed to the marginalization and displacement of many farmers and agricultural workers.
These transformations pushed Kurdish community leaders to consolidate their social position by strengthening their local authority and acquiring important economic roles through their property and influence. They also contributed to resolving many local issues by mediating with the national authorities to address the needs of poor farmers, using their wealth and influence while maintaining their Kurdish identity—an identity that had created tensions with authorities seeking to weaken their influence and efforts.
In contrast, a segment of the Kurdish population lost its livelihoods and was forced to migrate to major Syrian cities, where many worked as porters, construction workers, and mechanics, while others entered trade. This rural exodus helped poorer Kurds recognize an important social transformation: the growing mobilization of lower social classes, particularly workers among them.
Phase Two:
The transition from a mandate state to an independent state, along with the need to break away from the legacy narratives of identity formation and structures of power that had developed under the authority of an external power—France—combined with the accumulation of previous social, economic, and popular transformations, led to a second major upheaval in Syria.
As a result, the post-independence authorities faced the challenge of establishing a new foundation for the country. Their primary objective was to preserve Syria’s unity, reorganize the resources that had been used during the struggle against the French, and redirect them toward addressing emerging economic, political, and social challenges. A new generation composed of military and civilian groups came to dominate the state, forming a strong and unified apparatus under the banner of independence. Meanwhile, traditional elites and community leaders found themselves excluded from official representation, as new social and political forces monopolized positions of influence.
The emerging Kurdish generation from the Kurdish region also found itself excluded from this representation. Elites with social and educational backgrounds from different parts of Syria dominated positions of influence, with the exception of the Kurdish region. Members of this generation became divided among various political currents, including the Syrian Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Ba’ath Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other successors to Syrian political power. Their conflicts and rivalries often moved away from broader national interests.
Phase Three:
The previous upheavals paved the way for the emergence of authoritarian tendencies, the foundations of which were laid after Syria’s independence in 1946. With the decline of the National Bloc, new political formations emerged, including the National Party, the People’s Party, and the Republican People’s Party. This led to a shift in the focus of social and political support away from building a unified national narrative and toward rallying around specific figures and leaders in Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus.
These political frameworks were unable to inspire members of ethnic groups and minorities with the idea of pluralistic nationalism. Instead, they were often perceived as being rooted in Sunni Arab identity or one of its branches, which gradually contributed to the marginalization of minorities in political life.
These developments created tensions between urban and rural elites on one side and decision-makers on the other. The Alawites were able to benefit from this phase by strengthening the networks they had built, entering the civil service and military in large numbers, and eventually rising to positions of power through political influence, force, and military coups. In contrast, the Kurds—the inhabitants of the Kurdish region along the border strip—remained excluded from these transformations and continued to exist on the margins of the nation-building process and centers of influence.
Phase Four:
This phase was characterized by the army’s growing role in political life, a situation similar to what most Arab states experienced after the end of the Mandate period. Within a few years of independence, many newly established Arab republics shifted from parliamentary systems toward military rule.
What was notable in the Syrian case was that military coup leaders justified their interventions by claiming they sought to “restore order” amid political crises. However, events later showed that coup leaders quickly moved toward consolidating power around the figure of an authoritarian leader.
During this period, Arab armies suffered defeat by Israeli forces in Palestine in 1948. This contributed to the expansion of the Syrian army, whose personnel increased from 18,000 to 43,000 by 1951, a development reflected in the growth of the national defense budget. Furthermore, regional groups were once again marginalized, and the Kurds of the Syrian Jazira region continued to be excluded from decision-making centers and the highest military ranks.
The Impact of the Unrest on the Status of Minorities
The Syrian political system inherited from the French Mandate was characterized by fragility and the absence of clear strategic plans for integrating a country that was politically and socially fragmented. The rule of Adib al-Shishakli during the era of military coups represented the period in which the state most actively sought to forcibly integrate minorities into the Syrian national fabric. He attempted to impose “Syrianization” through physical and verbal coercion. Ultimately, this policy amounted to a form of Arabization that contributed to distorting the image of minorities in Syria’s public political discourse. It also contributed to the spread of a collective mindset that viewed minorities’ legitimate demands for partnership and guarantees protecting their existence and identity as acts of disloyalty. This coincided with the rise of more extreme forms of Arab nationalism based on the denial of minority rights in Syria.
Once again, the Kurds became a target of Arab nationalist rhetoric. They were portrayed as a problem, excluded from political life because of their rejection of Arabization policies, and accused of being agents and collaborators serving foreign powers.
Although two of the most prominent leaders of Syria’s military coups were of Kurdish origin, this did not lead to Kurdish participation in major decisions concerning the country. Their presidencies were cited as evidence of Kurdish integration into Syrian society, but not as recognition of the Kurds’ historical presence in Syria. It is striking that the rise of Kurdish figures to high-ranking positions has often been used as evidence of Kurdish integration, without being acknowledged as proof of the Kurds’ longstanding historical presence in the country.
Adib al-Shishakli held the military rank of brigadier general, while Husni al-Zaim was a colonel. This reflected the French policy of maintaining a degree of balance in institutional representation, whereby groups with less political influence received greater representation within the military. For example, when one group dominated political life, efforts were made to increase the representation of other groups in the armed forces.
While Sunni Arabs dominated political life in Syria in 1944, they were underrepresented in the army compared with their political influence. In contrast, Kurds were overrepresented in the army and security institutions despite their limited representation in parliament under the republican system. This balance, established under the French administration, was dismantled by Syrian Arab elites after they assumed power.
It is worth noting that Kurdish military leaders who came to power through coups did not necessarily hold Kurdish nationalist views. Both Husni al-Zaim and Adib al-Shishakli were sympathetic to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Al-Shishakli was a representative of Damascus within the party, which advocated the establishment of “Greater Syria” rather than emphasizing ethnic or religious identities. Al-Zaim and al-Shishakli also relied on social networks in Hama to build their support bases, which represented a common ground between them. Later, al-Shishakli joined the Arab Liberation Movement, founded in 1953 with the support of Sunni officers in Hama and nationalist social backing in that region.
For the most part, military officers did not seek to establish nationalist entities. Their Kurdish origins, as well as those of several second-tier commanders, were largely incidental compared with the shared ideology that united them. Unlike Husni al-Zaim and his deputy Muhsin al-Barazi, al-Shishakli never acknowledged his Kurdish roots. Instead, he adopted a strict position toward Kurdish cultural activities. Nevertheless, accusations and anti-Kurdish sentiments continued during that period.
The alliance between Husni al-Zaim and Muhsin al-Barazi sparked widespread backlash among Arab nationalists, who viewed it as an attempt to establish what they described as a Kurdish military regime. The Muslim Brotherhood also opposed al-Zaim’s secular reforms concerning women’s rights, voting rights, the niqab, and democratic reforms. The political climate shifted toward accusations that al-Zaim sought to establish a “Kurdish republic” that favored Kurdish and Circassian officers in the army at the expense of Arabs. After Sami al-Hanawi executed al-Zaim and al-Barazi, the Syrian press reported on the end of the so-called “Kurdish government.”
Al-Zaim sought to assume the role of a Syrian national leader by drawing on Kurdish social networks and forms of social solidarity while advocating Syrian nationalism. After his regime was overthrown, military academies and police schools were closed to Kurdish youth. During the period of separation between Syria and Egypt, the military coalition grew stronger, carrying out the March 1963 coup and insisting on Ba’ath Party representation in power, declaring the end of the dominance of the Sunni urban elite in Syria. Druze and Alawite officers assumed senior positions in the army and civilian institutions under the banner of Arabism.
The Ba’ath Party succeeded in establishing an Arabist doctrine within the military and strengthening nationalist mobilization through an inclusive ideological framework. The first Ba’athist government established in 1963 was marked by the emergence of a new generation that was more radical and anti-Western. The intensification of debates between Syrian nationalists and Arab nationalists deepened mistrust toward ethnic and religious minorities, in contrast with some of the policies pursued by France during the Mandate period. This left behind a heavy political legacy characterized by divisions and complex alliances that proved difficult to transform into an inclusive national project.
Three Opposing Movements
By the end of the French Mandate period, three main political movements had emerged in Syria’s Kurdish region: Arab nationalism, communism, and Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish nationalism became particularly active during World War II, drawing inspiration from principles declared by the Allies at various conferences. These principles raised Kurdish hopes for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state after the war, especially amid the Soviet Union’s growing pressure on Turkey beginning in 1945.
Among the most prominent principles were the Atlantic Charter, promises of self-determination, and President Woodrow Wilson’s principles, all of which were reaffirmed during World War II. In 1941, Britain and the United States pledged to support the right of peoples to choose their own form of government, restore their political rights, enable them to manage their own affairs, and return rights that had been taken from them by force. In theory, the principles and responsibilities outlined in the Charter applied worldwide.
The Kurds were excluded from United Nations discussions for more than a decade. During the French Mandate period, Kurdish tribes demanded self-rule for their regions, the adoption of the Kurdish language in education, and the allocation of military and administrative positions to the inhabitants of the region. However, these demands were ignored, and the Kurdish cause was gradually forgotten and denied.
With the establishment of the Syrian General Congress in Damascus in 1919—considered the first modern Syrian legislative body—prominent Kurdish figures participated alongside the country’s political and military elites. At that time, national identity was not the primary factor determining political participation, which allowed Kurds to gain access to Syrian political institutions and parliament.
The Kurds also benefited from the electoral system inherited from the French Mandate, securing seats in parliament during the 1947–1949 and 1954–1958 legislative terms, as well as several ministerial positions between 1949 and 1957. In the 1990 and 1994 parliamentary elections, a significant number of Kurdish representatives were elected. Despite this political presence, the Kurdish issue was never permitted to appear as a distinct item on the agenda of parliament or the government, and Kurdish demands remained largely absent from official political debates.
Conclusion: This marginalization took place under the banner of Arab nationalism, alongside the experience of the United Arab Republic and the series of economic, ideological, and political transformations that Syria underwent from the end of the French Mandate until the March 1963 coup. These developments forced Syrian society and its political elites to respond institutionally to the challenges facing a country governed by complex circumstances.
Instead, the narrative accusing Kurds of disloyalty continued to persist. Despite their contributions from the establishment of the Syrian General Congress until the fall of the former regime, this perception remains present, although not in an absolute or generalized manner.
The argument that Kurds ruled Syria at certain points in its history remains surrounded by tensions and contradictions. It is necessary to move beyond these debates and their lasting effects. The Kurds were never newcomers; their issue was never placed on the official agenda of government or parliament, and they have struggled to overcome a mentality of denial and conspiracy deeply rooted among some segments of the Syrian elite—a mentality that continues to exist, with little willingness in many circles to critically reassess it.
Although Kurds have participated in wars against Israel and, later, in the struggle against the Syrian regime, the disparity in how Kurds are portrayed remains one of the most complex issues facing the Syrian political landscape. Perhaps the most important recommendation for a sustainable Kurdish future in Syria is the consolidation of Kurdish partnership within state institutions and governance. This requires building a genuine partnership between Kurds and state authorities, along with recognition that previous policies are no longer capable of addressing historical and contemporary grievances.